Operation
Black Vote - (OBV) History
Between 1994
and 1996 Black communities were subject to severe social and political
pressure.
There were deaths
in police custody for which no one was held accountable. The Immigration
& Asylum Bill seemed to many to be a state-sanctioned policy
that criminalised Black people looking for sanctuary in Britain.
The Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Paul Condon, took the often uneasy
relationship between the police and the Black community to a new
low with his comments about targeting young Black people for street
crime. Figures showed that inner city schools had been disproportionately
expelling young Black youths, effectively condemning them to the
social scrap heap.
The New York-based
Human Rights Watch identified Britain as the country with the highest
incidence of racial attacks in Europe. Research at Southampton University
by law Professor Lawrence Lustgarden showed that Britain jails more
Black people per head of population than the USA.
Unemployment
within Black communities especially in areas with high Caribbean,
Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim populations - stood, and still
stands, way above the national average: with unemployment among
Black graduates three times the national average.
Many in the
Black community, young and old, felt a sense of powerlessness. Frustration
turned to anger on the streets of Brixton and Bradford as young
Blacks protested against authority.
In early 1996,
with the last date for a General Election 18 months away - Black
volunteers at Charter88 and activists at The 1990 Trust began exploring
ways of using the most important event in Britain's political calendar
to raise the concerns of the Black community.
We began by
collating political and demographic data in marginal constituencies
- and we soon realised that the Black vote was potentially immensely
powerful. In over 50 seats the number of African, Asian and Caribbean
voters was greater than its marginality. In another 50, our numbers
were such that we had the potential to play a significant role in
any closely fought contest.
A call to action
would have a solid base and an immediate focus - the power of the
Black vote at the coming General Election. The challenge was to
persuade the Black community to recognise that power and inspire
them to participate - and to serve notice on the political parties
that they ignored the Black electorate at their peril.
Operation Black
Vote was launched in July 1996. In just ten months we held over
100 meetings at schools, colleges, community centres, local party
offices and town halls up and down the country.
We distributed
over 250,000 voter registration cards; 500,000 leaflets in six different
languages, and 50,000 posters.
Over 200 articles
appeared in the national and international press, the Black press,
and a host of other journals and publications.
Ninety-seven
radio interviews and 27 television broadcasts spanned every region
in the country and eight countries worldwide.
An Early Day
Motion tabled on OBV's behalf received support from all sides of
the House of Commons.
Trevor Robinson
(of Tango fame) and John Daniels spearheaded a controversial poster
and cinema ad campaign.
An OBV collaboration
with Rock the Vote and MTV saw Linford Christie make time to do
an ad specifically for the music channel.
But we knew
from the outset that it would be OBV's impact in two specific areas
which would determine success or failure: the response of the political
parties to Black concerns and of the Black community to Operation
Black Vote.
In comparison
to any election before 1997, the positive attention the Black electorate
received from the major parties was unprecedented. And the party
leaders led from the front.
In a speech
that he would later make a point of sending to OBV, the then Prime
Minister John Major said, "I don't pretend that the prospect
for the young Black man in Brixton is yet as open as it is to the
young white man in the Home Counties.
It clearly isn't.
But we must try and make it so." Liberal Democrat leader Paddy
Ashdown pledged to make the House of Commons more representative,
and described it as "a white, male, middle-class club."
And Tony Blair emphasised his lifetime commitment "to fight
against racism."
At constituency
level, MPs and candidates across the country took part in OBV Question
Time meetings. For the first time in British political history,
every candidate we invited came to listen to the Black electorate
and argue their case.
We knew that
much of this attention was little more than electioneering. But
we also knew that promises would be made that would allow us, in
the weeks and months after the Election, to insist that they be
kept.
There were times,
early in the campaign, when we thought that even our minimalist
call to the Black community to register to vote - to use the most
basic instrument of representative democracy - was a triumph of
hope over reality.
A pervading
cynicism about British democracy had persuaded many Black people
that a conscious opt out was the only valid form of expression.
But we knew
we were onto something powerful.
At meeting after
meeting we argued that we inadvertently collude with those who view
us negatively by not using the political avenues open to us. "We
are powerful - and here's the proof. We just have to recognize it.
we insisted.
As the months
went on, the message began to get through. Operation Black Vote
began to establish a platform that gave African, Asian and Caribbean
communities in Britain a collective political voice - and those
communities began using it.
As the local
and national press picked up on this emerging political consciousness,
a feeling that we were being noticed inspired many more to get involved.
There is little
to no quantitative data on how many more Black people registered
to vote and/or voted in 1997 as a direct consequence of OBV.
In the few constituencies
where data is available, it shows that in predominately Black areas
voting and registration rose slightly, while in predominantly white
areas they fell.
We knew when
we began how much there was to do; that a ten-month campaign could
do little more than give our communities a sense that things could
be different and that OBV existed to help make that difference.
Political rhetoric
is easy and instant; translating it into reality is the hard work
of years. The disillusion of so many people - particularly young
Black men - would not and could not be addressed in the few months
before the Election.
A long term
strategy was the inevitable next step if we were to realise the
expectations we had aroused.
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